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Introduction
Does offering bonuses to non-striking employees who went beyond the call of duty and performed the duties of the striking employees contravene section 5 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA)? How compelling is the contention that the employer is simply rewarding volunteers for their efforts in ensuring that it fulfils clients' demands during a crippling strike?
More accurately, what is significant here is that without non-strikers going the extra mile, the employer would have lost market share as well as suffering reputational damage. From a different perspective, can it be argued that the interests of the employer in safeguarding the viability of the enterprise override concerns about the disproportionate treatment of striking employees?
The objections lodged by the striking employees and their union about the extra payment made to non-strikers are important. At the core of the objections is the likely detrimental effect on future strikes, as striking employees would be dissuaded from joining strikes based on the lure of reward. To this should be added that the practice has the effect of weakening the employees' collective bargaining effort, or even of sowing discord and disunity among members of a union and a workforce in general. In this sense, additional payments undermine the right to strike and invariably tilt the scales of power in favour of the employer. There is also the free-rider problem: if the striking employees' demands are met, the nonstriking employees who are within the bargaining component and who had performed the tasks of those on strike in addition to their own would end up benefitting twice. Firstly, the non-strikers would receive salary increments as a result of the sacrifices made by their colleagues, and secondly, they would recieve an extra income derived from the strike action. This paper engages with these difficult and interesting questions against the backdrop of NUMSA obo Members v Elements Six Productions (Pty) Ltd. 1 It also reflects on the conundrum created by the lacuna in the LRA left unattended despite recent amendments. This is also underlined by a related
The facts in Element Six Productions
Since the foundational cases of CWIU v BP SA 3 and OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v SACCAWU, 4 recourse by employers to defeat a protected strike by paying inducements, incentives or bonuses to non-strikers, though characterised as "innocent" rewards for "hard work", has been and still is a valid ground for litigation. The facts of Elements Six Production were straightforward. Members of NUMSA, UASA and SAEWA had embarked upon a protected strike in pursuit of their wage demands. As was to be expected, not all employees joined the protected strike. During the strike some of the non-striking employees performed extra duties, thereby enabling the employer to sustain production at a level sufficient to meet clients' demands. In appreciation of the non-striking employees' efforts in going the extra mile, the employer decided to pay them an additional sum termed "a token of appreciation". 5 In the aftermath of the strike, the striking employees were naturally aggrieved by the selective payment of the bonuses. It was this dispute over the payment of bonuses to non-strikers that found its way to the Labour Court.
The core issue before the Labour Court was whether the payment of bonuses to the non-strikers amounted to unfair discrimination against the striking employees. It was contended by the applicants that rewarding the non-strikers discriminated against the striking employees for exercising a right contemplated by the LRA in terms of section 5(1) of that Act, or constituted the provision of a prohibited advantage or promise of advantage to a person not utilising any right granted by the Act or for not engaging in any proceedings in terms of the Act as contemplated by section 5(3). On the other hand, the respondent retorted that it had not breached the provisions of section 5 and its payments were not discriminatory on any specified or unspecified ground. 6 The employer's second line of defence was that the criteria it had applied in making the payments were objective and rational and did not result in any corrosive effect on future strikes. 7
The labour court judgment
The court ruled that the payment of the "token" to the non-striking employees constituted differentiation, which amounted to discrimination within the context of section 5(1), 5(2)(c)(iii) and 5(2)(c)(vi) of the LRA, 8 and that the discrimination was unfair in that the striking employees were prejudiced for their participation in the lawful activities of their trade union, and the exercise of their right to strike. A declaratory order was made prohibiting the employer from ever again engaging in such an activity. The reasons advanced by Tlhotlhalemaje J for concluding that the employer had engaged in conduct prohibited by both subsections 5(1) and 5(3) and for making the declaratory order merit detailed analysis.
The lacuna
The labour court's decision recapitulates the reasons why tokens of appreciation are not to be paid to non-striking employees. There is no doubt that non-striking employees cannot be forced by their employers to do the task of striking employees. However, the LRA is silent on whether an employer can politely request non-striking employees to voluntarily perform such tasks. There is nothing in the LRA or any other statutory provision that prohibits an employer from utilising the services of its non-striking employees to perform work ordinarily performed by striking employees, and rewarding them for going the "extra mile". 9 In addition, no consequences are visited upon an employer that has politely asked non-strikers to volunteer to perform work ordinarily performed by striking employees. 10 It is unlikely that the court would prohibit the payment of "tokens" for work done during an unprotected strike, given the fact that there is no lawful right to strike that requires protection. Furthermore, the provision of section 10 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 11 escaped the attention of the drafters during its recent amendment in regard to these vexed issues. Although consensual overtime work is allowed, section 10 of the BCEA does not address the issue whether such overtime work may include work ordinarily performed by striking employees. 12 8 Elements Six Productions para 23.12.
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The constitutional and statutory context
In any discussion of the complex issue of discrimination in employment, the starting point is to look at the constitutional and statutory context. In that regard it is important to appreciate the trilogy of rights: the right to freedom of association, 13 the right to engage in collective bargaining 14 and the right to strike. 15 The LRA sets out to amplify the said fundamental right of freedom of association. 16 At the core of the LRA's guarantee of the fundamental right of freedom of association is the right of every employee to take part in the formation of a trade union and to become a member of a trade union. 17 A corollary of trade union membership is the right to participate in lawful activities of the union. 18 This brings to the fore the pivotal provisions of section 5(1) and 5(3), which read as follows:
( As per the above provision, to dismiss an employee for joining or participating in the affairs of a union is therefore automatically unfair.
The endorsement of trade union rights in the Constitution 19 and the LRA 20 essentially provides for strong protection of the rights of employees. 21 A trade union can be described as the in-between body that bridges the gap between an employer and an employee. 22 Essentially the role of a trade union is to safeguard the existing rights of its members and also to improve and enhance these rights. 23 All employees are entitled to join and participate in trade union activities. 24 Therefore, trade unions are essential to the furtherance of the concepts of equality and democracy in the workplace as they promote the interests of employees by ensuring that employees are placed in a position equal to that of their employers. 25 The court's enforcement of the LRA's dispute resolution framework is further illustrated in Mackay v ABSA Group, 26 where the court stated that:
All disputes arising from the employer-employee relationship must be effectively resolved. Such disputes are resolved through conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, and those of a collective nature through collective bargaining. It is clear that it could never have been intended that some disputes arising out of the employer-employee relationship are incapable of resolution in terms of the Act. 27 The court averred that the labour dispute resolution framework is deemed effective in protecting the rights of employees. 28 Furthermore, the protection of employees' rights is enforced through the process of collective bargaining within the dispute resolution system. 29 In National Police Services Union v National Negotiating Forum, 30 the court pointed out that the LRA does not place any duty on either the employer or the employee to engage in the bargaining process. The courts are not given authority to determine or influence the result of the bargaining process. 
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PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 7 negotiations is entirely dependent on the parties themselves. 31 This ruling essentially portrays that both parties to the bargaining process must be given equal power to ensure that there is democracy in labour relations. 32 It is undisputed that the balance of power in employment relationships favours employers over employees, so strikes are used as tools by employees to bring some sort of balance. 33 Botha 34 argues that a refusal to work grants employees a significant voice regarding what goes on in the workplace. Similarly, Estreicher 35 expresses the opinion that "without the right to strike, collective bargaining becomes collective begging". In the same spirit, Chicktay 36 advances that a strike action enables employees to preserve their dignity by showing the employer that they are "not just cogs in a machine". In addition, the Constitution entrenches the right of workers to go on strike. 37 The right to strike is recognised not only domestically but also through International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions such as the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 38 and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 39 which advocate for the protection of workers' rights.
Did the discrimination amount to unfair discrimination
In Elements Six Productions it was shown that there was a high demand for the employer's products and in order to meet the demands of the clients during the looming strike, the employer had to increase overtime shifts, for which employees were remunerated. 40 The employers contended that the firm's stocks had almost depleted whilst the demand for the firm's products continued; hence the need to come up with measures to continue with production in order to meet the demands of the firm's clients. 41 The Furthermore, in Elements Six Productions it was shown that the striking employees felt that they had lost out by going on strike, as they had not been given the token and were also not paid for the duration of the strike. The employees were also concerned about the fact that the non-strikers benefitted from the increase in wages attained as a result of the strike action, and the employer had therefore discriminated against the striking employees by not paying them the token too. 44 The employees in Elements Six Productions argued that in the case of FAWU v Pets Products, once it had been established that there was discrimination against employees for exercising a right conferred in the LRA, it was presumed that the discrimination was unfair until the contrary had been established. 45 The employers argued to the contrary that the courts in FAWU and NUM v Namakwa Sands 46 erred in concluding that discrimination against employees for striking was discrimination on a listed ground. This was so in that striking was not listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic, and the court in Namakwa Sands had not conceded that striking was a listed ground of discrimination. 47 It was further contended that if the employer's motive is not to unfairly discriminate, then the discriminatory conduct complained of cannot be seen as unfair. 48 More so, if an employer can show that there were rational and objective criteria for the payment of the bonus, the employer is justified in making such discrimination. 49 What was worrisome about the employer's arguments, though, was that they refused to disclose the payments made to the non-strikers, which suggested that the transparency of the "rational and objective criteria" used was questionable. for unfair discrimination is commensurate to that laid down in Harksen v Lane. 51 The initial step is to establish whether the employer's policy differentiates between employees. The second step entails establishing whether that differentiation amounts to discrimination, and the third step involves determining whether the discrimination is unfair. 52 Tlhotlhalemaje J observed that the employees had discharged the onus placed on them by demonstrating that there had indeed been differentiation which amounted to discrimination, and that in return the employer had not been able to demonstrate that its conduct had not infringed on the rights of the employees as they had contended, nor had it demonstrated that the discrimination was fair. 53 Tlhotlhalemaje J further observed that it was very unlikely that employees would volunteer to work shifts without an expectation of a reward. 54 More so, the veil of secrecy surrounding these payments led to an inference that they were not made merely as a token.
Undermining the Holy Cow of collective bargaining
In terms of what transpired in Elements Six Productions there is a great likelihood of employers gaining the upper hand and turning collective bargaining into collective begging. In future, no employees will heed the call to go on strike, and this indirectly limits the constitutional right to strike. In addition, the practice of awarding bonuses only to non-striking employees has the effect of weakening the employees' collective bargaining effort, or at least of causing discord and disunity amongst the members of a union, thus undermining the right to strike and invariably tilting the scales of the power play in favour of the employer. 55 In a similar vein, when non-striking employees perform the tasks of striking employees, it means employers can continue with a "business as usual" attitude. Such practices can be used as a strategy by employers to negate and dilute the intended effects of the protected strike action embarked upon by employees. 56 This undoubtedly degrades the status of collective bargaining as a constitutional tool to resolve disputes; it defeats the purpose of the LRA as identified in its section
51
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. Non-striking employees who are asked to perform the tasks of those on strike in addition to their normal tasks could view this as an opportunity to supplement their salaries during the duration of the strike. This could induce them to refrain from joining strike actions, or to abandon the strike midway, or to be deterred from taking part in strike action in future. 58 Additionally, the exercise of a right to strike with a view to advancing and addressing employees' legitimate concerns might be rendered ineffective, if not nugatory. In the alternative, if in the end the striking employees' demands are met, the non-striking employees who fall within the bargaining unit and who had performed the tasks of those on strike in addition to their own would end up benefitting twice, that is, from an increase in salary as a result of the sacrifices made by their colleagues, and from extra income derived from the strike action. This clearly cannot be a fair labour practice. 59 The consequences that flow from such disunity may be dire for non-striking employees, given the common knowledge that strikes normally tend to turn violent at or near workplaces. "It is not uncommon for strike violence to spiral into communities and the courts would be remiss and imprudent in not acknowledging these far-reaching consequences". 60 For example, in the case of Transnet SOC Ltd v SATAWU, 61 "a non-striking truck driver lost his life after a brick was thrown at his truck and hit him on the head". 62 In addition, in SATAWU v Ram Transport South Africa (Pty) Ltd, 63 employees participating in a protected strike threatened replacement employees in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA with sticks and forced them to vacate the workplace.
The function of collective bargaining is to ensure that parties come to an understanding about the issue in dispute and that the dispute will not necessitate industrial action or lock-outs to reach a resolution. 64 This would benefit both the employer and the employee in that the employer would save on production time lost and the employee would not forfeit the right to be 66 It must be understood that the Constitution was enacted to redress the injustices of the past, not only in society but also in the field of labour. It is for this reason that the LRA has the dual function of inculcating transformation in the workplace as well as in society at large, because an injustice to an employee at a workplace adversely affects his family and the community in which he resides.
In Foodgro (A division of Leisurenet Ltd v Keil), 67 the Labour Appeal Court acknowledged that unjust laws that govern society negatively impact on labour relations. 68 In addition, labour peace essentially entails the elimination of strife which takes the form of strikes and lock-outs. By engaging in collective bargaining, parties would be able to resolve disputes amicably and speedily rather than having to resort to strikes and lock-outs. 69 This, in turn, would result in a decrease of work days lost and greater productivity. 70
The Sword of Damocles 71
Granted that an employer is statutorily prohibited from using economic incentives to defeat a protected strike, does that mean an employer is prevented from taking measures aimed at ensuring the viability of its business? It bears repeating that strikes are intended to cause financial loss. 72 A careful reading of the strike provision indicates that the answer is no. This is because section 67(5) provides an escape route in the face of a crippling protected strike. Even in the context of a protected strike, an employer still possesses the ultimate weapon of last resort under section 67(5). If it can be proved that the economic harm caused by an industrial action has become unbearable, the dismissal of the protected strikers on the grounds of operational requirements 73 may be justifiable. The Sword of Damocles means any impending danger and, in this case, if an employer suffers financial loss due to a prolonged strike, employees risk being dismissed in terms of operational requirements. Also see Collins English Dictionary 2018 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/sword-of-damocles.
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73
Section 189(1) of the LRA, "when an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons based on the employer's operational requirements, the dismissal becomes a weapon only in exceptional circumstances, when operational requirements dictate its use. 74 The LRA recognises that an employer may dismiss employees if the operational requirements of its business make such a dismissal unavoidable. 75 This is supported by the recent case of SATAWU v G4S Aviation Secure Solutions. 76 Section 213 of the LRA defines operational requirement as one based on "the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of the employer". However, failure by the employer to prove that the reason for the dismissal is fair and is based on the employer's operational requirements will result in the dismissal's failing the substantive test. 77 Courts will uphold a dismissal as fair only where it was both substantively and procedurally fair. 78 Du Toit 79 argues that "a fair reason for dismissal is not limited to efforts to save a business but may be related to any legitimate business objective, including bona fide attempts at improving its efficiency, profitability or competitiveness". Furthermore, the fact that the measure was the last available resort needs to be demonstrated by the employer, which needs to show that all alternative steps had been considered to prevent retrenchments. 80 On the other hand, the dismissal of an employee because of his or her participation in a protected strike will be labelled as an "automatically unfair dismissal". 81 In the same vein, section 67(4) of the LRA provides that "an employer may not dismiss an employee for participating in a protected strike". However, section 67(5) states that "it is lawful to dismiss a striking employee for reasons based on the employer's operational requirements" and section 77(3) provides that:
A person who takes part in protest action or in any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of protest action that complies with subsection (1), enjoys the protections conferred by section 67.
employer must consult, (a) any person whom the employer is required to consult in terms of a collective agreement". The question to ask is how much economic hardship an employer is required to tolerate before it is entitled to retrench striking workers. It is trite that economic harm through industrial action is both expected and accepted by all parties involved in collective bargaining. 85 The complex issue of the retrenchment of strikers involved in a legal strike is freighted with history. 86 However, the power of the employer to inflict "capital punishment" on the strikers who partake in a protected strike is constrained by the fact that such dismissals are categorised as automatically unfair. 87 The vexed question that arises in each case is whether the employees were dismissed for participating in a protected strike or whether they were dismissed for the operational requirements of the employer. Where the reason for the dismissal is participation in a protected strike and not the employer's operational requirement, then the dismissal will be branded as automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(a).
It is submitted that rather than contravening the safeguards in section 5(1) and (3), an employer confronted with a prolonged and crippling protected strike may resort to the dismissal of the strikers on the ground of operational requirements. had to determine whether their retrenchment constituted a dismissal for operational requirements or whether it was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(a). An important question concerned the extent to which an employer is expected to endure the harm occasioned by industrial action before it is permitted to effect a dismissal for operational reasons. On the facts, the court found the dismissals to have been genuinely grounded in operational requirements, but held that they were procedurally unfair because the employer took the decision to close down the operation prior to engaging in proper consultations with the union.
At first glance, it would appear that an employer in a protected strike is statutorily emasculated. However, an employer can still invoke replacement labour to a limited extent for continuous production or to retain the legal power of dismissal. The employer can invoke operational requirements to dismiss employees engaged in a protected strike, although it is not that simple. Therefore, while the LRA provides important safeguards with regard to freedom of association, collective bargaining and striking, it does not entirely insulate protected strikers from dismissal. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the underlying purpose of labour law is to serve as a countervailing force against the power of the employer. Otto KhanFreund's 89 aphorism still carries force: "The relations between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between the bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power". Hence, preserving job security is one of the overarching objectives of the LRA and to the same extent the Constitution. 90 In a nutshell, the vulnerability of those in employment is an abiding feature of the contemporary world of work.
A declaratory order
The court in Elements Six Productions deemed a declaratory order prohibiting the repetition of similar conduct to be appropriate. 91 The court reasoned that "it would be neither competent nor appropriate for this court to grant any monetary relief in this case". 92 The authors, however, disagree with this court's declaratory order as it is little more than a slap on the wrist for the employer. Although it was acceptable not to award damages, the courts could have considered compensation (no need to prove damages) for unfairly discriminating against the striking employees in terms of section 158(1)(a)(vi) of the LRA, which reads: "The Labour Court may -(a) make any appropriate order, including -(vi) an award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act." The authors argue that an order that the employer should pay compensation could possibly have a deterrent effect on employers who willy-nilly undermine collective bargaining in future.
Conclusion
Elements Six Productions demonstrates that if employers in a protected strike context are allowed to pay incentives, rewards or bonuses to nonstrikers and these rewards are benignly styled as "token of appreciation" for hard work, then there is a real danger that one of the core objectives of the LRA, namely promoting collective bargaining, may be defeated. In addition, incentivising non-strikers also impedes the speedy resolution of labour disputes. 93 Being cognisant of the employer's need to meet the demands of its clients during the strike and to avoid the loss of market share, the authors understand that the employer had to increase the amount of overtime worked, for which non-strikers were remunerated. Strikes in South Africa are becoming more common and it cannot be gainsaid that this adversely affects the profitability of businesses and the economy at large. Inasmuch as the employer has the right to find means to keep its business afloat, we argue and maintain that the right to strike should not be undermined by the payment of an incentive innocently dressed as a token.
It is beyond doubt that the payment of bonuses to non-striking employees unavoidably places strikers at a huge disadvantage, so NUMSA's complaints about the payment of bonuses to non-strikers makes sense. They have practical force and some ethical appeal. Rewarding non-strikers would affect or influence a union member's decision whether or not to strike in future. This is principally due to the fact that some strikers may feel that to strike is futile because the benefit of the strike is conferred also upon nonstrikers, and moreover the non-strikers get something "extra" if they work during the strike. The non-strikers may say that their decision not to strike is vindicated because firstly they get what the strikers wanted in any event, that is, a higher wage, and secondly, they receive additional remuneration in the form of overtime payment. Thirdly, they are rewarded for working during the strike, the reward taking the form of an additional payment. In 
